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ABSTRACT 
 
 RSA is the most popular Public Key Cryptosystem (PKC) and is heavily used 
today. PKC comes into play, when two parties, who have previously never met, want to 
create a secure channel between them. The core operation in RSA is modular 
multiplication, which requires lots of computational power especially when the 
operands are longer than 1024-bits. Although today’s powerful PC’s can easily handle 
one RSA operation in a fraction of a second, small devices such as PDA’s, cell phones, 
smart cards, etc. have limited computational power, thus there is a need for dedicated 
hardware which is specially designed to meet the demand of this heavy calculation. 
Additionally, web servers, which thousands of users can access at the same time, need 
to perform many PKC operations in a very short time and this can create a performance 
bottleneck. Special algorithms implemented on dedicated hardware can take advantage 
of true massive parallelism and high utilization of the data path resulting in high 
efficiency in terms of both power and execution time while keeping the chip cost low. 
We will use the “Montgomery Modular Multiplication” algorithm in our 
implementation, which is considered one of the most efficient multiplication schemes, 
and has many applications in PKC.  
 In the first part of the thesis, our “2048-bit Radix-4 based Modular Multiplier” 
design is introduced and compared with the conventional radix-2 modular multipliers of 
previous works. Our implementation for 2048-bit modular multiplication features up to 
82% shorter execution time with 33% increase in the area over the conventional radix-2 
designs and can achieve 132 MHz on a Xilinx xc2v6000 FPGA. The proposed 
multiplier has one of the fastest execution times in terms of latency and performs better 
than (37% better) our reference radix-2 design in terms of time-area product. The results 
are similar in the ASIC case where we implement our design for UMC 0.18 µm 
technology. 
In the second part, a fast, efficient, and parameterized modular multiplier and a 
secure exponentiation circuit intended for inexpensive FPGAs are presented. The design 
utilizes hardwired block multipliers as the main functional unit and Block-RAM as 
storage unit for the operands. The adopted design methodology allows adjusting the 
number of multipliers, the radix used in the multipliers, and number of words to meet 
the system requirements such as available resources, precision and timing constraints. 
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The deployed method is based on the Montgomery modular multiplication algorithm 
and the architecture utilizes a pipelining technique that allows concurrent operation of 
hardwired multipliers. Our design completes 1020-bit and 2040-bit modular 
multiplications* in 7.62 µs and 27.0 µs respectively with approximately the same device 
usage on Xilinx Spartan-3E 500. The multiplier uses a moderate amount of system 
resources while achieving the best area-time product in literature. 2040-bit modular 
exponentiation engine easily fits into Xilinx Spartan-3E 500; moreover the 
exponentiation circuit withstands known side channel attacks with an insignificant 
overhead in area and execution time. The upper limit on the operand precision is 
dictated only by the available Block-RAM to accommodate the operands within the 
FPGA. This design is also compared to the first one, considering the relative advantages 
and disadvantages of each circuit.  
 
 
  
                                                 
* With a multiplication engine that utilizes half of the device (i.e. which use 10 multipliers) 
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ÖZET 
 
RSA, günümüzde en sık kullanılan Açık Anahtarlı Şifreleme (AAŞ) türüdür. 
Daha önce hiç karşılaşmamış iki tarafın birbirleri arasında güvenli bir iletişim kanalı 
oluşturabilmesi için AAŞ sistemleri kullanılır. RSA’de en temel işlem modüler çarpım 
işlemidir ve özellikle kullanılan anahtar 1024 bitten uzunsa, bu işlem çok yoğun bir 
hesaplama gücü gerektirir. Günümüzün kişisel bilgisayarları birkaç RSA işlemini bir 
saniyeden kısa bir zamanda bitirebilirken, avuçiçi bilgisayarları, cep telefonları ve smart 
kart gibi az işlem gücüne sahip ortamlarda, bu yüksek hesap gücü gerektiren işlem için 
kullanılacak ilave donanıma ihtiyaç vardır.  Buna ek olarak binlerce kişinin aynı anda 
erişim isteyebileceği web servis sağlayıcılarında, bu işlem, bir performans darboğazı 
olarak görünebilir. Donanım için geliştirilen bazı özel algoritmalar sayesinde çok büyük 
ölçekte paralel hesaplamalar yapılabilir ve böylece donanımın kullanım oranı artırılarak 
hem enerji harcaması düşürülür, hem de toplam işlem zamanı kısaltılır. Bu amaçla, en 
verimli modüler çarpım işlemlerinden biri olarak bilinen ve birçok AAŞ alanında 
kullanılan “Montgomery Modüler Çarpım” algoritmasını kullanacağız. 
Đlk olarak “2048-bitlik ve 4 tabanında çalışan Modüler Çarpım” dizaynını 
anlatacağız ve bunu daha önceki çalışmalarda sıkça kullanılan 2 tabanındaki modüler 
çarpım devreleriyle karşılaştıracağız. Bizim devrenin, diğer devreleri simule etmek için 
yaptığımız referans devreye göre çalışma hızının % 82 arttığını  ve bunu sadece 
%33’lük bir alan artışıyla gerçekleştirdiğini gördük. Ayrıca, Xilinx xc2v6000 
FPGA’inde 132 MHz’de çalışan bu devre, referans dizayna göre %37’lere varan 
oranlarda, zaman alan çarpımını azalttı. Benzer kazanımları, UMC 0,18 µm teknolojisi 
için sentezlenen devre ile de elde ettik. 
Đkinci bölümde ise nispeten ucuz FPGA’lere uygun, hızlı, parametrik ve yan 
kanal ataklarına karşı dayanıklı bir modüler çarpım devresini ve bir üs alma devresini 
sunuyoruz. Bu dizayn, FPGA üzerinde bulunan çarpım birimlerini ve blok RAM’i 
kullanacak şekilde geliştirildi. Dizaynımızda çarpım işlemi için kullanılan bileşenlerin 
tabanı (radixi), çarpım ünitelerinin sayısı ve toplam word sayısı parametrik olarak 
istenen özelliklere göre ayarlanabilir. Mimari yapıda pipelining tekniğini kullandık ve 
bu bize yüksek frekanslarda, aynı anda birçok çarpım işlemini yapma özelliği 
kazandırdı. Dizaynımız 1020-bitlik ve 2040-bitlik modüler çarpım işlemlerini Xilinx 
Spartan-3E 500 FPGA’i üzerinde sırasıyla 7,62 µs ve 27,0 µs’de bitirmektedir ve bu 
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ölçümler FPGA’de bulunan çarpım birimlerinin sadece yarısı kullanılarak elde 
edilmiştir. Dizanımız daha önceki devrelerle karşılaştırıldığında en düşük alan zaman 
çarpımını elde etti. Ayrıca 2040-bitlik üs alma devresinin Xilinx Spartan-3E 500 çipine 
kolaylıkla sığabileceğini gördük. Kullandığımız üs alma devresi, bilinen tüm yan kanal 
ataklarına karşı korumalı bir şekilde dizayn edildi ve bu koruma çok ufak bir ek 
donanım getirilerek başarıldı. Üs alma devresi, işlemde kullanılan sayılar blok RAM’e 
sığdığı sürece her büyüklükteki sayı için kullanılabilir. Bu dizanımız ayrıca ilk dizaynla 
da avantaj ve dezavantajları açısından karşılaştırıldı.  
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List of Terms and Symbols 
 
 
 µs: micro seconds: 10-6 seconds. 
 ASIC: Application Specific Integrated Circuit: Type of hardware that is 
manufactured to realize specific calculations (It cannot be reprogrammed). 
 Block RAM: The type of storage in an FPGA, that has write, read and address 
ports and write enable input. Only one “data word” can be requested and/or can 
be written in one clock cycle. 
 C: Ciphertext: Encrypted message. 
 CIOS: Coarsely Integrated Operand Scanning: A multi-precision multiplication 
algorithm 
 CPA: Carry Propagate Adder. 
 CRA: Carry Ripple Adder 
 CRT: Chinese Remainder Theorem: A technique that can be used to speed up 
modular exponentiation. 
 CSA: Carry Save Adder. 
 d: Private key.  
 DPA: Differential Power Analysis. 
 DSP48: Data path element present in advanced FPGAs,  that is capable of fast 
multiplication and addition. (Digital Signal Processor) 
 DSS: Digital Signature Standard 
 e : Public key. 
 ECC: Elliptic Curve Cryptography  
 FPGA: Field Programmable Gate Array: Type of hardware that has some 
memory and LUT’s that can be re-programmed by a computer. 
 Gate: Basic building blocks of ASIC’s.  
 LUT: Look up Tables: Logic functions in a circuit are mapped to FPGA’s 
SRAM based programmable storage units. 
 m: Plaintext: Numerical representation of the message to be encrypted. 
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 MM:  Montgomery Multiplier. 
 ms: mili-seconds: 10-3 seconds. 
 n: (p.q) Modulus for multiplications in RSA or bit length of the modulus 
 p , q: Large primes (512 bit or longer) 
 PE: Processing Element (The unit structure which the circuit is built upon) or 
total number of Processing Elements 
 PKC: Public Key Cryptosystem. 
 Prime Numbers: Positive integers that can be divisible by only itself and one 
without remainders. 
 Radix: Base of a number. 
 Register: Storage unit that can read or written synchronously both in ASIC’s 
and FPGA’s. 
 RSA: A PKC algorithm found by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman in 1978. 
 s: Total number of words (such as two 17-bit words) 
 Slice: Basic building blocks of an FPGA, which consists of two LUT’s, two flip-
flops and two carry chains. 
 SPA: Simple Power Analysis. 
 SRAM: Static Random Access Memory: Type of storage that is made of four 
transistors and does not need a refresh signal. 
 w: Bit length of a single word (e.g. 17-bit words) 
 Φ(n) : Count of the numbers which are relatively prime to n. (Euler’s Totient 
Function) 
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1 Background Information 
 
 We can explain the term “cryptology” as the science of keeping data secret by 
preventing unauthorized access. Nowadays, as the Internet and the technology are 
evolving at a fascinating rate, cryptology plays a crucial role in many areas in our lives 
like accessing our bank account online, registering our courses, using credit cards and 
so on. It is so integrated that many of us are not even aware. 
We can divide the cryptology into two parts: Symmetrical and asymmetrical. 
Former has only one key, which is used in both encryption and decryption. Its main 
application is ciphering large volumes of data, whereas the latter has two distinct keys, 
(one key for encryption, the other for decryption) and is used for key exchange and 
digital signature. Asymmetric Key Cryptosystems are also called Public Key 
Cryptosystems (PKC). 
The functions used in the asymmetrical cryptology depend on the “Number 
Theory”, which is the branch of pure mathematics related with the properties of 
numbers in general, and integers in particular, and also other problems that occur from 
their study. The mathematical background of the algorithms will be explained while 
giving the details of the important functions. 
At first, we will lay out the basic properties of asymmetrical cryptography and 
its main uses. In the following section, the side channel attacks (the attacks related not 
to the algorithm but to the implementation) and their countermeasures will be discussed. 
In the last part of this section, we will compare two dominant hardware platforms.  
1.1 Asymmetrical Cryptography 
The problem of common key delivery and management among communicating 
parties is the main use of asymmetrical cryptography (which is also called Public Key 
Cryptosystem [PKC]). Moreover, PKC’s can be used for digital signature. There are 
mainly six algorithms (or methods) that are commonly used in PKC: 
• RSA [1] 
• Diffie-Hellman [12] 
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• Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) [13] 
• El-Gamal [27] 
• Digital Signature Standard (DSS) [28] 
• Paillier [29] 
In all PKC’s, there are two keys, one public key (known by anybody) and one 
private key (only known by the owner). Public keys are used to encrypt messages and 
verifying the signatures; on the other hand, private keys are used to decrypt the 
ciphertext and sign messages.  
Private and public keys are related to each other; however one cannot derive the 
private key by knowing only the public key in the practical computation limits for 
adequate key lengths.  PKCs are similar to one way functions, where anyone can 
encrypt a message (or verify a signature), but no one can decrypt a message (or sign a 
message) without the related private key.  
1.1.1 Euler’s Totient Function 
In Number Theory, the Euler’s Totient of a positive integer n is defined to be the 
number of positive integers less than or equal to n that are co-prime to n. The function is 
calculated as follows: 
Φ    1 	 1

|  
For instance: 
Φ45  45  1 	 13 1 	 15  45  23  45  24 
1.1.2 Fermat’s Little Theorem 
Fermat's Little Theorem states that if p is a prime number, then for any integer a, 
 (ap – a) will be evenly divisible by p. 
 
a
p ≡ a (mod p) 
 
We work in (mod n) for the base and (mod Φ(n)) for the exponent and so we can 
generalize Fermat’s Little Theorem using Euler’s Totient Function: 
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aΦ(n) ≡1 (mod n) (where n and a is relatively prime) 
1.1.3 RSA Algorithm Basics 
Rivest, Shamir and Adleman implemented a novel scheme for key exchange in 
1978 [1]. It depends on the “Integer Factorization Problem” which is hard to solve if the 
bit length of the operands is adequately large*. We introduce three well-known 
characters in the cryptology world to describe RSA: Alice, Bob and Eve. Alice and Bob 
want to communicate through a common channel, which is wire-tapped by Eve. We will 
assume that Eve is a passive adversary who can see every message going through the 
channel; however she is unable to alter it. Alice and Bob have to share a secret key to 
encrypt the data they are sending via symmetrical cryptography; therefore, at first they 
have to exchange the common key using this channel.   
1.1.4 The Visualization of RSA  
 
• Alice has a safe and its key. She sends the safe unlocked to Bob, but keeps 
the key. 
• Bob generates the common key (using a random number generator) to be 
used in the symmetrical cryptography and puts it into the safe and locks it. 
• Bob sends the “locked safe” back to Alice. 
• Alice (using the key of the safe) unlocks the safe and gets the hold of the 
common key (which is generated by Bob). 
• As they have the same secret key, they can communicate by a symmetrical 
cipher using that key. 
Figure 1 depicts each step of this communication. 
                                                 
* Today’s most common use is 1024 bits. 
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1.1.5 RSA Setup 
For k bit security level, following operations must be carried out by Alice: 
• Find two distinct (k/2) bit long prime numbers (p, q) 
• Calculate n=p.q 
• Calculate Euler’s Totient Function Φ(n)= (p-1)(q-1) 
• Generate a random number e (e<n), which is relatively prime to Φ(n); in 
other words,  GCD* (Φ(n), e) must be 1. 
o e is the public key. 
• The multiplicative inverse of e in mod Φ(n) gives out private key, d, which 
is calculated by “Extended Euclidian Algorithm”: 
o d ≡ e-1 mod Φ(n) 
After these computations Alice sends {e, n} to Bob and keeps d. 
 
                                                 
* Greatest Common Divisor 
          Figure 1. Visual Depiction of RSA 
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1.1.6 An RSA Example 
Alice has to perform the following calculations: 
• p=13 and q=11 (randomly choose two prime numbers) 
• n=p.q=143 
• Φ(n)=(p-1)(q-1)=12 x 10=120. 
• e=7, (randomly chosen) check GCD(120,7)=1    
• e
-1 (mod 120) ≡ d ≡ 103 (calculated by Extended Euclidian Algorithm) 
Then Alice sends {e=7, n=143} to Bob. 
Bob has a secret message m=111 (m<n). He must calculate C=me (mod n) 
C= 1117 ≡ 45 (mod 143). 
Bob sends “C=45” to Alice. Alice decrypts the message using her private key d: 
45d=45103 ≡ 111 (mod 143)   
 
1.1.7 Modular Exponentiation 
 
As the previous example indicates, RSA is based on modular exponentiation. 
However, if we try to perform an exponentiation operation of a large number by just 
successive multiplying, it can take years to calculate for large exponents. Instead, we 
can use “Binary Exponentiation” (or Square and Multiply algorithm): 
Inputs:  mbase, eexponent (ek-1,ek-2,….,e1,e0)2 
Output:  result 
1. result1 
2. for i=k-1 to 0 do 
a. resultresult * result 
b. if (ei==1) then resultresult*m 
3. return result. 
 
The above algorithm is valid both in this normal form and in modular arithmetic 
form. However, Algorithm 1  has some weaknesses against side channel attacks and 
Algorithm 1: Binary Exponentiation (left to right) 
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timing attacks (see Section 1.2), therefore we must use a more secure algorithm. As the 
steps 2.a and 2.b in Algorithm 1 indicate, the core operation in modular exponentiation 
is modular multiplication.   
1.1.8 Modular Multiplication 
We can compute modular multiplication by the following operations: 
• Ordinary multiplication (or Shift and Add Method)  
• Trial division to find the remainder. 
This technique is acceptable for one or two multiplications; however the loops in 
RSA will be iterated thousands of times; therefore, we need a better algorithm to solve 
this problem.  
Modular multiplication is the most time consuming operation in RSA and entails 
prohibitively expensive multiplication and subsequent division operation; and thus is 
also very demanding on hardware resources. Montgomery Multiplication (MM) 
algorithm [2] enables these costly operations to be performed easily and efficiently both 
in hardware and software because it replaces the time-consuming division operation in 
the reduction phase with simple shift operations. The method consists of repeated 
additions and shifting; therefore it is well-suited for hardware implementations. The 
Montgomery Multiplication algorithm for radix-2 is given in Algorithm 2. 
 
Algorithm 2: Radix-2 Montgomery Multiplication 
INPUT: X = Multiplicand,(Xk-1,Xk-2,…,X1,X0)2, X<N 
       Y = Multiplier, Y<N 
       N = Odd modulus  
OUTPUT: MM(X,Y,N)=R = X.Y.2-k  (mod N) where  
        k = bit length of N. 
1. R  0; 
2. for i from 0 to k-1: 
a. if Xi=1, then RR+Y; 
b. if R is odd, then RR+N; 
c. RR/2 
3. if (R>N) then RR-N;   
4. return R  
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Montgomery multiplication is not efficient when we perform only a few 
multiplications, because MM operates in N-residue class. The normal form and the N- 
residue form are mapped to each other by a one-to-one function (Figure 2).  
 
To convert the operands to N-residue form, we have to calculate MM(X, 22k, N) 
= X.2k = X at first. Now, we can use X and its multiples in Montgomery loop; because 
MM(X, X, N)= X². After the last iteration, we have to use MM one more time to 
convert the result from N-residue form to normal form by multiplying with one, i.e. 
MM(R, 1, N)=R. There are two extra multiplications in one exponentiation, and as the 
number of iterations in RSA loop is very large (>512), these additional multiplications 
will be negligible for practical purposes.  
  
1.2 Side Channel Attacks and Countermeasures 
Although the RSA algorithm with certain key sizes is considered safe in the 
mathematical sense, straightforward implementations of modular exponentiation on 
hardware (and also software) may have vulnerabilities that can lead the attackers to 
recover the secret key easily. All implementations (on both hardware and software) 
have some unintentional, yet observable outputs (through side-channels), which may 
compromise the desired security level substantially. Therefore, we have to mask the 
side-channel information such as the variations in the power consumption of the device 
and execution time of the algorithm that depend on the secret key. We also have to 
prevent the faulty outputs or so-called safe-errors that can be easily induced by spikes in 
        Figure 2. N-Residue Form   
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the input voltage or any other facile means. Below are the known attacks and their 
countermeasures: 
1.2.1 Simple Power Analysis Attack (SPA)  
In the binary exponentiation algorithm (Algorithm 1), there are two operations 
(square and multiply) with different power characteristics. In most hardware 
implementations, squaring consumes less power than multiplying; therefore, by 
analyzing the instantaneous power consumption of the device, an attacker can deduce 
the secret key even in a single run. Therefore, we have to choose an algorithm that has a 
more regular execution pattern than the ordinary square and multiply method.  
1.2.2    Timing Attacks 
We can make Algorithm 1, resistant against SPA attacks by squaring and 
multiplying in each step regardless of the exponent (using different variables) and in the 
next iteration, we have to select the correct variable according to the exponent, therefore 
in case of having 0-bit in the exponent, we have performed one dummy multiplication 
(we will use the outcome of the squaring operation only). This method is called 
“Square-and-multiply-always” algorithm. However, when Chinese Remainder Theorem 
(CRT) is used for faster execution times, there will be compare and subtract steps 
(which is comparing message m with secret primes “p and q”) at the beginning of the 
algorithm. By finding three distinct m values, (m1< p < m2 < q < m3) (The execution 
time will be largest for m3); the attacker can find the ranges of the secret primes (i.e. p 
and q). A brute force search in these ranges can be used to factorize n.  
1.2.3    Fault Injection Attacks 
Square-and-multiply-always algorithm simply masks the Hamming weight of 
the exponent. However, this method cannot resist against the so-called “C and M safe-
error” attacks depicted in [20], which are based on faults inflicted on dummy 
multiplications and used memory locations respectively, which do not change the final 
outcome. This allows the attacker to distinguish the dummy operations and 
consequently obtain the secret key bits. 
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Algorithm 3: Montgomery Powering Ladder 
Inputs: m = input message,  
   d = (dt-1,...,d0) exponent. 
Output: C=md  
1. R01  
2. R1m 
3. for i=t-1 to 0 
a. if (di==1) 
    R0R0R1   R1(R1)
2  //in parallel 
b. else 
    R1R1R0   R0(R0)
2   //in parallel 
4. return R0  
  
An efficient countermeasure to these attacks is to use the “Montgomery 
Powering Ladder” algorithm (Algorithm 3) proposed in [20]. This algorithm 
additionally provides parallelism for hardware implementations and is highly regular. A 
fault induced in any step of the algorithm escalates to the end of the execution which 
always produces an incorrect result; therefore the attacker cannot find any relation to the 
secret exponent. 
 Many techniques can be employed to prevent outputting faulty results. As the 
errors induced by C and M safe-error attacks are completely at random, running the 
algorithm twice and checking the equality of the two results can easily prevent these 
attacks. Another method is after the calculation of md ≡ C (mod n), checking whether   
C
e 
≡ m (mod n), where e and d are public and private keys respectively; however both 
methods are costly.  In case a countermeasure is needed, the extra check proposed in 
[23] can be incorporated to the data path with virtually no cost.  
1.2.4    Differential Power Analysis Attack (DPA) 
If a cipher algorithm is deterministic, an attacker uses the implementation as an 
encryption oracle and encrypts as many messages as possible. Statistical analysis of the 
differences in the power traces sampled for different input messages may reveal secret 
exponent “d”. In “the doubling attack” which is explained by Yen et al [21], the 
implementation can be broken in only two runs (one with input message m, other one 
with m2).  
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A well-accepted countermeasure is to embed randomness into the algorithm so 
that the power traces of each run will be different, even if the same input values are 
used. There are three kinds of randomization methods that can be used in modular 
exponentiation md ≡ C (mod n): 
( 1 ) Message Blinding: We choose a random variable r < n and calculate re (mod n) 
and multiply this with C*:  
(C×re)d  (mod n) ≡ Cd
 
× r
ed ≡ m × r (mod n). 
 
At the end of exponentiation, we can get the ciphertext C back by multiplying it 
with r(-1) (mod n). The multiplicative inverse of the random value r has to be 
computed on the fly, which is naturally costly and undesirable from the 
implementation point of view.   
( 2 ) Modulus Blinding: The modulus n is multiplied by some random variable r (here 
r around 216 is enough for practical purposes) and all exponentiation operation is 
carried out in mod (n × r) [23]. We need to reduce the result to (mod n) at the end 
of the calculation. In this method, we need to compute additional variables†, 
which makes this method time costly. 
 
( 3 ) Exponent Blinding: We can add random multiples of Φ(n) to the exponent before 
the main computation. At the end of the exponentiation, there is no need for 
correction since md+r.Φ(n) ≡ md (mod n); therefore, this method of blinding costs 
considerably less than the other methods. For all practical purposes a 17-bit 
random number (the word size used in this implementation) r is sufficient 
resulting in (1/s×100) percent overhead, where s is the number of words in the 
exponent d. 
 
There is another type of attack where all precautions to prevent side channel 
attacks, except for modulus blinding, fail. When the input message is selected as           
m = (n-1), there will be two intermediate results (see [21]) depending on the related bit 
                                                 
* ciphertext 
† For 2N-1 < n < 2N, we need to calculate both 22N (mod n) and -(n0)
-1 mod 2N, and 22N+32 (mod n) and         
-(n0)
-1 mod 2N+16 where r is a 16-bit integer for the Montgomery multiplication. 
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of the exponent: 1* and (n-1)†. The instantaneous power graph of a single run will 
immediately shows two distinct characteristics for these two possible outputs; therefore, 
as a simple countermeasure, we propose to halt the calculation if the input message is 
selected as (n-1), which is easy to check. 
 
1.3 Dedicated Hardware Basics 
 
There are two dominant types of dedicated hardware in the market: ASICs and 
FPGAs. The main difference between these two is re-programmability.  ASICs 
functionality, once manufactured, cannot be changed at all; however FPGAs can be re-
programmed many times. On the other hand, ASICs take the advantage of being fine 
grained; therefore have a higher computation performance and lower power 
consumption when compared to FPGAs.  
Both hardware platforms have the technology metric, “the feature size‡” (like 90 
nm or 65 nm). As the feature size shrinks, maximum possible frequency increases, the 
power consumption and the cost of the chip decrease. 
 
1.3.1 ASICs 
ASIC is an integrated circuit (IC) customized for a particular use, rather than 
general-purpose use. A typical ASIC generally may have the following components: 
• 32-bit CPU (maybe 16-bit or 64-bit)  Central Processing Unit: The unit which 
carries out sequential operations those are not “dense”. 
• ROM  Read Only Memory: Non-volatile memory which is generally used to 
store constants and conversation tables.  
• RAM  Random Access Memory: Volatile memory which holds the data 
required by current operations. 
• Flash Memory  Non-volatile memory, which can be written and read. 
                                                 
* For even exponents 
† For odd exponents 
‡ The minimum feature size is the width of the smallest line or gap that appears in the design. 
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• DSP  Digital Signal Processor: A unit that is specifically designed for 
performing frequently used operations (like MAC* operations) 
The complexity of an ASIC is usually measured with the number of logic gates 
it has (e.g. 10 k gates or 2 M gates). According to the number of gates, the ASICs can 
be divided into groups like: VLSI (Very Large Scale Integration) or ULSI (Ultra Large 
Scale Integration). 
ASICs have two types of development procedures: Full-Custom versus Standard 
Cell Library based designs. In full-custom designs, special acceleration and PAR (Place 
and Route) methods can be applied on smaller scale (which can be layout level) for 
better performance. In “Standard Cell Library” based designs, the functions in HDL† 
code are directly mapped to predefined cells like AND2, OR4, NAND3, FF, etc. by 
CAD tools. 
 
1.3.2 FPGA  
   The basic building block of FPGAs is called slice. Each slice has two flip-flops 
as storage units and two 4-input SRAM based LUTs‡ which can be programmed as 
combinational functions, two independent fast carry chains, and MUXs among them 
[18].   Each slice can assume the role of a LUT, shift register or distributed RAM. The 
term “CLB§” can be used for describing two or four slices.  According to their 
manufacturing purposes, FPGAs can have the following structures: 
• Embedded processors (soft or hard): Some expensive operations can be 
performed in hardware (by LUTs), while less complex and sequential operations 
can be carried out by a general purpose CPU. The balance between hardware 
and software will provide the best time area product according to the design 
specifications. 
• DSP units: Multiply and Accumulate (MAC) operation is frequently used in 
DSP, therefore some FPGAs have dedicated blocks (e.g. DSP48 in Xilinx Virtex 
4 Series) to perform multiplication and addition operations efficiently.  
                                                 
* Multiply and Accumulate 
† Hardware Description Languages, such as Verilog and VHDL. 
‡ Look Up Tables. 
§ Configurable Logic Block 
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• Multipliers: While the adders can be implemented efficiently with LUTs which 
utilize fast carry chains, the multiplication operation implemented by LUTs 
performs poorly. Therefore many FPGAs have dedicated multiplication units 
that support up to specified bit length (e.g. 17 bit unsigned operands).  
• Dual-port Block RAM (BRAM): As the distributed memory consumes slices, 
which are one of the most important resources in FGPA designs; large portions 
of data must be stored in Block-RAMs. Block-RAMs have synchronous write 
and read ports which provide fast access times. 
 
1.3.3  The Differences between ASICs and FPGA  
The advantages of FPGA platform can be summarized as follows: 
• Field re-programmability: The implementation can be upgraded or changed 
at any time without any cost. The user just needs to upload the new bit stream.   
• Shorter time-to-market: There is no need to deal with layouts, masks or other 
manufacturing steps in FPGA designs. 
• No upfront NRE*: The FGPA design flow is cost effective when small 
volume of chips is needed. 
• Simpler design cycle: Automated software takes care of all design steps. (from 
synthesis to PAR stage)  
On the other hand, ASIC has beneficial properties like: 
• Full custom capability: ASICs are custom built circuits; therefore the 
designers have the opportunity to optimize the implementation in terms of both 
area and speed. 
• Higher raw internal clock speeds: ASIC implementation allows higher 
frequencies, even if their feature size is the same with the FPGAs.  
• Lower unit costs: For very high volume productions, the cost per chip in 
ASICs is lower than that of FPGAs.  
• Smaller form factor: The area utilization is higher in ASICs when compared 
to FPGAs, because some sources have to be wasted in an FPGA, when the 
circuit cannot exactly fit the board. 
                                                 
* non recurring expenses 
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2 Radix-4 Implementation of 2048 bit Modular 
Multiplication on ASIC 
 
 
Previous studies with pipelined approach* for modular multiplication ([6], [8], 
[9], [11]) generally suffer from high latency because of the data dependency among 
processing elements (PE) in ASIC implementations. Although their performance can be 
adjusted by various parameters such as bit length of the words and number of PEs, they 
have an upper speed bound on which adding more PEs have no beneficial effect. 
Likewise, conventional radix-2 based non-pipelined organizations ([7], [10]) cannot be 
optimized further than N clock cycles (bit length of the modulus); for instance, the 
fastest implementation [10] needs N+1 clock cycles. As speed being our primary 
concern in this ASIC implementation, we focus on decreasing the total clock cycles 
with radix-4 scheme, with minimal area. We lay out the synthesis results for both UMC 
ASIC library and FPGA. 
2.1 Algorithm 
 
  The MM can be used with different radices. Popular choices are radix-2, radix-4 
and radix-8 [24]. In [25], it is shown that radix-4 would be a wise choice in terms of 
speed and area. (Radix-2 is slow, and radix-8 is under-utilized). Higher radices than 8 
need much more space and necessitate additional calculations, which reduce overall 
efficiency and frequency. 
 
2.1.1 Booth Recoding 
 We have to express the multiplier, X, in MM using a different representation, 
known as Booth recoding [26], where the digits are {-2,-1, 0, 1, 2} for efficient radix-4 
implementation (the multiple “3” is not used because it cannot be calculated easily by 
shift and/or invert operations). The booth converter reads three consecutive bits of the 
                                                 
* The calculation is divided into simple stages that can be overlapped to speed up the operation. 
 
 
15 
 
multiplier, X, to decide which multiple of the multiplicand, Y, is going to be added. The 
conversion (-2Xi + X(i-1) + X(i-2)) is shown in Table 1. 
For instance, with Booth recoding technique, 27 = (011011)2 can expressed as: 
(beginning from i = 1, and adding 2 to i in each iteration since base is 4): 
• For i = 1: 110 = -1  (empty bit is assumed as 0 i.e. i(-1) = 0) 
• For i = 3: 101 = -1 
• For i = 5: 011 = 2  
 27 = (2,-1,-1)Booth 
Xi X(i-1) X(i-2) Output 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 1 
0 1 0 1 
0 1 1 2 
1 0 0 -2 
1 0 1 -1 
1 1 0 -1 
1 1 1 0 
   Table 1. Booth Recoding 
 
We can check the recoding as follows:  
-1 x 40 = -1 
-1 x 41 = -4 
 2 x 42 = 32 
The result is 32-4-1 = 27. 
 
2.1.2 Radix-4 Implementation 
 
In radix-2 MM, we add the modulus N to the partial result R, if R is odd, and 
shift right afterwards (Algorithm 2). In radix-4 MM, we must add multiples of N to 
make the result divisible by four, because we need to shift R to the right twice. We have 
four possible multiples (0, 1, 2, 3) of N and as these values are in radix-4 modular 
arithmetic, we can rewrite these possibilities as (0, N, 2N, -N). Therefore, all the 
multiples of N we need, are easy to handle in hardware by just shifting and/or bitwise 
 
 
16 
 
inverting. For signed calculations, “two’s complement form” is used, so we must add 
one (using carry-in of the adders) for negative Y (-N does not need this correction since 
it is an odd integer). The radix-4 MM algorithm, which is similar to the radix-4 
multiplier in [25] is given in Algorithm 4. 
As the numbers used in Algorithm 4 are signed, they have to be represented with 
one bit more than N, i.e. k+1. At the end of calculation, negative results must be 
converted by one last addition of N. 
 
Algorithm 4: Radix-4 Montgomery Multiplication 
INPUTS: N is odd modulus 
        X is multiplicand, X=(0,0,Xk-1,Xk-2,…,X1,X0)2 < N, X-1=0 
        Y is multiplier, Y<N 
        {} is used for bitwise concatenation. 
OUTPUT: MMr4(X,Y,N)=R = X.Y.2-(k+2)  (mod N) (k=2048) 
1. R  0; 
2. for i from 1 to k+1 step 2: 
a.  RR + Booth{Xi, X(i-1),X(i-2)}*Y 
b.  if ({R1,R0}+ {N1,N0})%4==0) then RR+N; 
c.  else if ({R1,R0}+{N0,0})%4==0) then RR+2N;  
d.  else if ({R1,R0}-{N1,N0})%4==0) then RR-N; 
e.  RR/4 
3. return R 
 
2.2 Architecture 
2.2.1 Carry-Save Adder (CSA) 
 We need a very fast yet small adder for the Montgomery modular multiplication 
algorithm, as the addition will be the core operation that will be repeated millions of 
times. Carry ripple adder can be used for smaller operands; whereas carry propagation 
for larger numbers (like 1024 bit) will be a significant limitation on the whole circuit. 
As we are adding to the same number R in each step of the algorithm, we can use carry 
save adders as shown in Figure 3, whose longest combinational path is independent 
from bit length of the operands. Overall critical path is just serially connected XOR 
gates in the full adder. CSA takes three operands and reduces them to two and the result 
is in redundant format. (i.e. sum and carry are calculated and stored separately): 
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Figure 3. A three-bit CSA  
 
2.2.2 Carry Propagate Adder (CPA) 
 At the end of each multiplication, we have to convert the result from redundant 
form to normal form. As we cannot directly add these two 2048-bit integers (i.e. sum 
and carry) in one clock cycle (due to hardware limitations), we have to divide this 
process into sub additions. We used a 32-bit carry ripple adder (CRA) for 64 clock 
cycles as shown in Figure 4. 
The CPA has two 32-bit 64-to-1 MUX and one 2048-bit shift register.  Two 
2048-bit input registers (sum and carry) is part of the MM logic, not CPA; therefore we 
only need one 2048 bit register for CPA. 
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Figure 4. Carry Propagate Adder* 
 
In radix-2 implementation, we can add four possible values to partial product in 
each iteration and these values are (0, N, Y, Y+N). One could pre-compute Y+N at first  
 
                                                 
* Grey boxes are registers and [ ] is used for bitwise concatenation. 
sum carry 
shift register >> 
64x1 mux (32-bit) 64x1 mux (32-bit) 
CRA (32-bit) 
 
carry   
Bitwise OR   
[2047:2016]  
Figure 5. Radix-2 Montgomery Multiplier 
[2049:1] 
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and then store it in a register, so using only one CSA array of 2048 bit would suffice. 
Another approach (instead of one CSA array and one extra register of 2048 bit) is using 
two CSA arrays and add N and Y on-the-fly, which turns out to be more efficient; as 
depicted in Figure 5. 
In radix-4 implementation, we need 12 pre-calculated numbers so storing all of 
them will be redundant. (Four possibilities are from booth recoding of X (i.e. Y, 2Y, -Y,  
-2Y) and three possibilities are from N (i.e. N, 2N, -N). Therefore we need to add these 
numbers using two CSA’s like in the radix-2 case as shown in Figure 6. 
 
 
 
In Figure 6, the CSA arrays are signed as the inputs can be negative. The carry-
in of the upper CSA is used for two’s complement of Y. Although the number from the 
output of the second CSA is divisible by 4, we have to check two least significant bits 
(LSB) of carry and sum registers in order not to lose information, because the output is 
in redundant format. The possible values of the two LSB of the sum and carry registers 
are ({00, 00}, {01, 11}, {11, 01}, {10, 10}).  Except for the first one (00, 00), the 
remaining cases need to be corrected by a carry that is going to be added in the next 
clock cycle via the carry in of the lower CSA array.   
Figure 6. Radix-4 Montgomery Multiplier 
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2.3 Theoretical Analysis of Performance  
We examine various designs synthesized for different technologies to compare 
with ours. Each design offers a distinct solution to the same problem and has its own 
advantages and disadvantages. We focus on modular multiplication performance and 
Table 2 shows the number of clock cycles required for one 2048-bit modular 
multiplication with different Montgomery multipliers.  
 
Design Implementation Time Complexity Clock Cycles 
Proposed Radix-4 N/2+(N/32)*1,5 1120 
[14] Radix-2, pipelined N 2048 
[10] Radix-2 N+1 2049 
[11] Radix-2, pipelined N+3 2051 
[7] Radix-2 N+2+N/32 2114 
[8] Radix-2, pipelined* (N/(w1*p)). Max (p , N/w2) 2124 
[6] Radix-4, pipelined 
 2 

  1  2 ,  

  2  
 2 2  1  

  1 ,  !"#$" 
~2128 
(w=128, 
NS=8) 
[9] Radix-2, pipelined 2N +N/w-1             if N/w+1 < (2p) ~4128 
[15] Radix-2, pipelined 3*N 6144 
Table 2. Time Complexities† for One 2048-bit Modular Multiplication 
 
For the design in [8], it is stated that 2048-bit modular multiplication takes 26,55 
µs with a 80 MHz clock, therefore we can deduce that the multiplier uses around 2124 
cycles to compute one modular multiplication. In this architecture, the word-length of 
the operands, X and Y, can be chosen separately (w1 and w2). 
Our radix-4 implementation and [7] uses CPA to convert numbers from 
redundant format to non-redundant format. The radix-2 multiplier in [7] needs only one 
addition with CPA; therefore the overhead is N/32. The architecture described in [10] 
                                                 
*  For pipelined design, we try to find optimum values. 
†  w is bit length of a word and p is the number of processing elements or pipeline stages (PE or NS) 
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does not need this conversion, but uses more registers to compensate. Our radix-4 
design first converts the number (costing N/32 cycles) and checks whether the result is 
negative. If, for instance, the result is negative, it adds N to result to bring it to the 
desired range which is from 0 to (N-1). The result can be 50% percent negative on 
average so the overhead will be (N/32)*1.5.   
2.4 Synthesis 
We implemented the design using “Verilog” HDL and verified with “ModelSim” 
[30] simulation tool. We synthesized to both UMC 0.18 µm Standard Cell Library and 
Xilinx xc2v6000-6bf957 FPGA, which has following properties: 
• Number of Slices: 33792 
• Number of Slice Flip Flops: 67584 
• Number of 4 input LUTs:  67584 
 
To compare our radix-4 design with [7] and similar designs, we also 
implemented a reference radix-2 core whose schematic is depicted in Figure 5. Both 
radix-2 and radix-4 designs have been synthesized with area and speed priority to 
consider time x area criterion (using execution time and slices) in FPGAs.  
 
2048-bit (MM) Slices Freq Ex. time (µs) Time x area 
Radix-4 (speed) 16657 132.4 8.47 140 905 
Radix-4 (area) 16549 90.9 12.34 203 904 
Radix-2 (speed) 12564 137.2 15.41 193 588 
Radix-2 (area) 10920 107.1 19.74 215 545 
Table 3. Xilinx Synthesis Tool (XST) Synthesis Results* 
 
We try to optimize both designs for a fair comparison. The synthesis results for 
FPGA, illustrated in Table 3, show that our radix-4 core in comparison with radix-2 
design has following features: 
                                                 
* As speed optimized cores have smaller time area product they are going to be used for comparison with 
other designs 
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• The frequency decreases a negligible amount (3.6%), because we use 
inverters along the critical path in radix-4 design. 
• Execution time is shortened dramatically (by 82%), since the cycle count is 
approximately halved, while keeping the frequency nearly the same. 
• Time area product also improves by 37%, which is one of our main goals. 
 
Design Technology Freq (MHz) Area Ex.Time (µs) 
Proposed (radix-4) Xilinx xc2v6000 132.4 16657 slices 8.47 
Reference (radix-4) UMC 0.18 µm 80  158k gates 14.00 
[6]* AMI05_fast 147 (T=6.8;w=128) 
 
~66k  gates 14.90 
Reference (radix-2) Xilinx xc2v6000 137.2 12564 slices 15.41 
[14]† Xilinx Virtex 2‡ (?) 129.1 (7222) slices 15.87 
[9] 0.5µm CMOS 166 (T=6.0; w=64) 85k gates 24.87 
Reference (radix-2) UMC 0.18 µm 80  118k gates 26.43 
[8] N/A 80 N/A 26.55 
[10] Xilinx xc2v6000 70.6 23060 slices 29.02 
[11] Xilinx xcv1000 ~52 (11k) slices 39.44 
[7] (REDC) 0.65 µm SOG 50 (120k) gates 42.28 
[15] Xilinx V812E-BG- ~96 (10960) ~64 
Table 4. Overall Speed Comparison for 2048 bit modular multiplication 
 
We compare performances of the multipliers in terms of execution time in Table 
4. The area values in parenthesis are calculated with interpolation and are 
overestimated, because only the area of the datapath is subject to change in case of 
doubling the operands’ bit length, not the area of the control unit. As one cannot 
estimate the area coverage of the datapath and control unit separately for each reference 
design, we have to assume that the datapath dominates the whole circuit area for 
comparison purposes.  
Our radix-4 design has the lowest execution time in Table 4 and outperforms the 
other designs by a great margin, although it does not have the highest frequency. Our 
                                                 
* The areas of [6,9] are calculated with the parameters given in Table 2. 
† Excluding pre- computation  unit: This design uses pre-computed values, but the pre-computation unit is 
not included in the multiplier (it is a part of the exponentiation circuitry) 
‡ [14] does not mention the model of the FGPA, therefore we assumed that Xilinx Vertex 2 series was 
used. 
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UMC 0.18 µm implementation is also faster than other ASIC based designs. The 
authors in [10] claim to have the fastest MM whose execution time is more than triple 
of ours for the same technology. 
Although Table 4 shows a general comparison among a wide range of designs, we 
have to compare time area products of FGPA designs and ASIC designs separately. Not 
all designs are synthesized to the same technology, therefore we cannot directly use 
execution times, instead we can use “total clock cycles for one multiplication” as the 
performance indicator. 
 
Design Area (slices) Clock Cycles Time x Area* 
Reference (radix-2) 12564 2114 1.424 
[10] 23060 2049 2.533 
[11] 11000 2051 1.209 
[14] 7222 2048 0.793 
[15] 10960 6144 3.609 
Purposed (Radix-4) 16657 1120 1.000 
Table 5. The Time Area Products for FPGA designs 
 
In Table 5 and Table 6, the proposed design and the other multipliers are 
compared in terms of (area × time) metric.  The design in [14] seems to have the 
smallest time-area product in Table 5 ; but, as stated before, the pre-computation unit 
which will consume considerable amount of hardware space is not included in the area. 
Therefore, the proposed radix-4 design has one of the best (area × time) metric among 
FPGA designs. 
 
Design Technology Area (k gates) Clock Cycles Time x Area 
Proposed UMC 0.18 µm 158 1120 1.000 
[6] AMI05_fast 66 2128 0.794 
[9] 0.5µm CMOS 85 4128 1.983 
Reference 
(radix-2) 
UMC 0.18 µm 118 2114 1.410 
[7] (REDC) 0.65 µm SOG 120 2114 1.434 
Table 6. The Time Area Products for ASIC designs 
                                                 
* Time area product is normalized to proposed design. 
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In Table 6, only [6] has a better time area product than ours. Our radix-4 
implementation offers 41% decrease with respect to its radix-2 reference, which is a 
similar case shown in Table 3. 
2.5 Conclusion  
We modified the well known radix-2 Montgomery multiplication (Algorithm 2) to 
radix-4 scheme to decrease (time × area) product and obtained a significant reduction 
(37% in FPGA and 41% in ASIC) in comparison to our radix-2 reference core. Our 
radix-4 implementation for 2048 bit operands is the fastest among the other designs 
given in the literature (both in execution time and total clock cycles). The main 
advantage of the radix-4 scheme over radix-2 schemes is providing twice the 
performance at the expense of placing bitwise inverters in the critical path. Using larger 
MUXs and the necessity to convert negative numbers to positive at the end (3% 
increase in clock cycles on average) are among the main disadvantages of the proposed 
architecture, which are greatly compensated by the reduction in execution time and 
(time × area) metric. 
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3 Parametric, Secure and Compact Implementation of 
RSA on FGPA 
 
 
One encryption or decryption operation in RSA, the first and most widely 
deployed public key cryptosystem, requires the execution of thousands of modular 
multiplications. The challenge is usually designing fast hardware multipliers to meet the 
timing requirements of cryptographic applications, which cannot be attained with 
software realizations on general-purpose processors. The endeavors toward designing 
the fastest hardware multipliers are meaningful especially when the throughput is of a 
concern (e.g. in server applications where thousands of cryptographic operations are 
performed). In literature therefore, there is a plethora of reports of very fast 
implementations of modular multipliers in hardware, which utilize considerable amount 
of resources. 
ASIC’s and FPGA’s are two commonly used hardware platforms for 
cryptographic implementations where the latter becomes more and more popular 
recently since it is reconfigurable and relatively easy to access from economical and 
usability point of view. Therefore, some of the previous works utilize resource rich, but 
relatively expensive FPGA devices to design fast multipliers. There is, however, a 
paucity of interests in the implementation of multipliers on the smallest and the most 
economically accessible FPGA devices such as Xilinx Spartan 3 series [18]. As our 
dependency on public key operations is increasing at an impressive rate even on the 
simplest devices such as car keys and identity cards, there is a great initiative to design 
fast multipliers on the cheapest possible way; therefore Xilinx Spartan 3 FPGAs make 
the products financially viable and shortens the time-to-market period.  
As the security level provided by public key cryptosystems is directly related to 
the bit length of the key and 1024-bit RSA is thought to be not providing adequate level 
of security any more, RSA with 2048-bit (and longer) keys will be more and more 
popular to meet the security challenge of the future. Therefore, there is a strong need to 
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implement multipliers with the longest key possible on the cheapest device without 
sacrificing speed.  
Koc et al. [5] proposed several algorithms to implement the Montgomery 
multiplication operation in software. These algorithms also prove to be useful for 
hardware implementations when fast block multipliers are available as in the case of 
many FPGAs. Moreover, these multipliers can work in a pipelined fashion to take the 
advantage massive parallelism, despite the fact that these software algorithms are 
originally designed for a single multiplier that is available in general-purpose 
processors.  
Previous studies employing conventional radix-2 based non-pipelined 
organizations [7, 10, 19] and pipelined approaches [6, 8, 9, 11, 15, 17] generally avoid 
using multipliers which consume a considerable amount of chip space, and have a long 
combinational delay. Instead, they perform multiplication by repeated addition through 
carry-save adders (CSA). Although the repeated addition approach seems to be a 
reasonable solution for ASIC realizations, the FPGA’s have a different inner structure 
that allows us to implement alternative circuits. For instance, a recent work by Suzuki 
[3] successfully utilizes powerful DSP macro cells available on an expensive FPGA 
device to achieve the best time performance for multiplication and exponentiation 
operations. 
At first, we present the CIOS method [5] for Montgomery multiplication on 
which we base our design in Section 3.1. In the following sections, we introduce our 
architecture and explain the details of its inner workings and comment on the simulation 
results. In Section 3.4, the results of synthesis are presented. In the next section, we 
compare our circuit with previous realizations. Finally, we summarize the achievements 
and contributions followed by a research plan for future in Section 3.6. 
3.1 CIOS Method  
  While all of the multi-precision Montgomery multiplication algorithms in [5] 
require the same number of word-level multiplications, the number of additions and 
memory requirements slightly differ. The CIOS method seems to be the best choice for 
hardware implementation since it has a regular execution pattern and needs only s+3 
words (the least among the others) memory space where s is the number of words in one 
operand. Likewise, McIvor et al. [4] also conclude that the CIOS method, which is 
given in Algorithm 5, provides the fastest timing results for FPGA implementations. 
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The operands and the modulus in Algorithm 5 are represented as arrays of words, e.g.   
a = (as-1, as-2, …, a1, a0). 
 
Algorithm 5: CIOS Montgomery Multiplication 
Inputs: aj, bj: Operand words (w bits each) 
        nj: Words of the modulus (w bits each) 
        s: Number of words in the operands 
        2w:=radix, C: carry, S: sum  
        n0
-1:= multiplicative inverse* of n0  
        {} used for concatenation 
 
Output: t[i]:= intermediate and final result, all words 
of t are assigned to 0 at first. 
         
for i=0 to s-1 
1. C0 
2. for j=0 to s-1  
a. {C,S}  tj + aj × bi + C   
b. tj  S 
3. {C,S}  ts + C 
4. ts  S 
5. ts+1  C 
6. C  0 
7. m  t0 × (-n0
-1) mod 2w    
8. {C, S}  t0 + n0 × m 
9. for j=1 to s-1 
a. {C, S}  tj + nj × m + C     
b. tj-1   S                
10. {C, S}  ts + C 
11. ts-1  S 
12. ts  ts+1 + C 
 
3.2 The Multiplication Engine 
In this section, we outline our design criteria used in the implementation and 
explain the implementation details. 
  
                                                 
* “Least significant word of inverse n”  in mod 2r, where 2
r-1 < n < 2r 
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3.2.1 Design Criteria 
It is essential to lay out the design criteria to meet the challenges and 
requirements of the application. These criteria are enumerated as follows: 
( 1 ) The design must be flexible to fit in both small and large FPGA’s efficiently 
with adjustable number of processing elements. 
( 2 ) The bit-length of the words must be parametric so that the full performance of 
multipliers is utilized. 
( 3 ) The design must be scalable to work with operands of virtually any length (e.g. 
2048 bit, 4096 bit, etc.) 
( 4 ) 2048-bit exponentiation engine must easily fit into even a smallest FPGA with a 
good timing performance. 
( 5 ) The implementation must resist against all side channel attacks with minimal 
overhead. 
( 6 ) All hardwired multipliers must work at maximum possible frequency (They 
should be instantiated as registered multipliers). 
( 7 ) All variables for operands must be kept in Block-RAM’s to ensure minimum 
area consumption. 
( 8 ) The connection network must be simple yet effective. 
As Algorithm 5 is specifically designed for software implementations, we need 
to modify it for efficient computation in hardware by taking advantage of parallelization 
through hardwired multipliers. The execution graph of Algorithm 5 modified for 
pipelined computation is depicted in Figure 7. The circuit essentially consists of 
processing elements (PEs, shown in Figure 8) which are responsible for executing a 
single iteration* of the loops in Steps 2 and 9 of Algorithm 5. Once PE0 generates the 
first word of the intermediate result (i.e. the least significant word), the next processing 
unit PE1 concurrently starts the computation for the second iteration of the loop with the 
values it obtains from PE0. When a PE finishes the computing one iteration, it is 
immediately assigned to the next available iteration. The results of last PEs are kept in 
dual port Block-RAM. 
 
                                                 
* Steps 2 and 9 of Algorithm 5 are performed together within the same PE. 
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3.2.2 Implementation Details 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Before the execution of each iteration of the loop (at each increment of the loop 
counter “i”), the value “m” must be calculated as shown in Step 7 in Algorithm 5.  (The 
value of “n0
-1
” is calculated offline (only one word) and fixed as long as the modulus 
does not change).  However, in the meanwhile, other PEs are still performing 
multiplication operation, therefore to maintain a continuous data flow, we need to insert 
FIFO buffers among the PEs and compensate for the time lost by the pre-calculation 
step. After “m” is ready, there are two important steps remaining for execution: Steps 
2.a (multiplication) and 9.a (reduction). These steps account for all computation burden 
since they are word multiplications; the remaining steps are only initializations. Once 
the value ti is calculated in Step 2.a, it can immediately be used in Step 9.a.  
PE0 PE1 
Figure 7. Execution Graph of The Parallelized CIOS algorithm 
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As only one word per cycle can be requested from each Block-RAM, only the 
first PE directly receives data from Block-RAMs, and only the last PE writes words ti to 
the Block-RAM. All PEs forward “used input variables” (aj and nj) and the sum to the 
next PE to exploit data reuse and simplify connection network. Figure 8 shows the inner 
structure of a processing element, which mainly consists of two multipliers, two adders 
and six registers. 
3.2.3 Parametric Design 
We can adjust the multiplier to meet the application requirements or to utilize a 
given FPGA device efficiently by changing the following three parameters at the 
compile time: 
( 1 ) Number of PEs (PE): Total number of PEs is the main area vs. performance 
trade-off metric. The proposed design must have at least two PEs, because the 
first and last processing elements are hardwired to RAM. In other words, total 
number of block multipliers must be at least four. The upper bound for PEs is 
determined with the amount of hardwired multipliers of the target FPGA, which 
is 10 in our case (i.e. 20 block multipliers in total). 
sum 
Mult. 
 
    3-input Adder 
From previous PE 
Pro 
Carry Register 
carry 
Mult. 
  3-input Adder 
Pro carry 
Sum Register 
To next PE 
sum 
Sum Register Product Register 
Product Register 
Carry Register 
aj bi 
m nj 
Figure 8. The Structure of a Processing Element 
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( 2 ) Radix (R): This parameter determines the bit length of the hardwired multipliers 
and adders shown in Figure 8.  As the radix closely relates to the maximum 
combinational path delay in the adder design, it has a direct effect on the 
frequency. This parameter must be adjustable to take full advantage of the block 
multipliers in a given device to achieve the best timing performance. 
( 3 ) Number of Words (s): The radix and the number of words in each operand 
together determine the bit-length of the operands; for instance, for 2048-bit 
operands and radix=16, the number of words is 128. The number of words 
determines also the depth of the Block-RAM. 
 
3.3 Simulation Results 
The clock cycles required for one multiplication heavily depends on the number 
of PEs. More PEs result in faster designs as expected. However, the multiplier 
utilization decreases when the number of PEs increases. Similarly, using longer words 
also has a negative effect on the frequency due to longer carry chains in adders used in 
PEs. 
 Table 7 shows the exact cycle count for one modular multiplication including 
data load time from the Block-RAM. The multiplication circuit has the following 
timings (see Figure 9 in Appendix for waveform): 
• After start signal is asserted, it takes 9 cycles for the first PE to yield the first word 
of the result. 
• The number of clock cycles spent between the appearances of the first word of the 
results in consecutive PEs is 9. 
 The Number of PEs 
Bitlength-#words 2 4 5 6 8 10 
4080* (240 words) 30256 15154 12139 10132 7630 6136 
2040 (120 words) 7936 3994 3211 2692 2050 1672 
1020 (60 words) 2176 1114 907 772 638 630 
510 (30 words) 646 352 330 326 322 318 
 Table 7.  Clock Cycles Required for One Multiplication (radix=217) 
                                                 
*The key length must be a multiple of 17 bits (because our multipliers are 17 bits long) and (s/PE) ratio 
must be an integer to take the full advantage of block multipliers.  
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The overall cycle count can be approximated (with error margin less than 5%) 
using the following formula:  
CC = max ((14+s), (12+PE*9)) *(s/PE) ≈ 
%&'(%
)*   (for large s) 
where CC, PE, and s stand for the total clock cycles, the number of processing 
elements, and the number of words, respectively.  
As indicated in [5], the CIOS method requires 2s2+s word multiplications. If 
there were no data dependencies, the required clock cycles would be (2s2+s)/(2*PE). 
The PE utilization is over 85% for 2040-bit or larger operands which can be seen in 
Table 8. 
 
 
The Number of PEs 
Bitlength-words 2 4 5 6 8 10 
4080 (240 words) 95.4 95.2 95.1 94.9 94.6 94.1 
2040 (120 words) 91.1 90.5 90.1 89.5 88.2 86.5 
1020 (60 words) 83.4 81.5 80.0 78.4 71.1 57.6 
510 (30 words) 70.8 65.0 55.5 46.8 35.5 28.8 
Table 8. Utilization Ratios (%) 
 
3.4 Synthesis Results 
In this section, we provide the synthesis results summarizing the resource usage 
and timing performance of the multiplier and exponentiation circuit for the target 
device. We implemented our design using Verilog and simulated with ModelSim [30] 
tool. 
3.4.1 Setup and Synthesis Configuration 
 We use XST (Xilinx Synthesis Tool) from Xilinx ISE v9.1 package with 
following optimizations:  
( 1 )  Register Balancing 
( 2 )  Equivalent register removal 
( 3 ) Optimization Effort: High 
( 4 ) Optimization Priority: Speed 
( 5 ) Maximum Fan-out: 17 
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The target device is Xilinx 3s500e-4FG320C whose properties are given in [18]. 
3.4.2 Synthesis Results 
Table 9 shows the resource usage for different number of processing elements 
from 2 to 10. As can be observed in the table, the resource usage is modest even for the 
maximum configuration with the largest number of processing elements. 
 
       Table 9. Synthesis Results for Multiplication Core*  
 
For 1020-bit or longer operands, a multiplication engine with 4, 5 and 6 PEs 
offer the lowest time-area product (Table 10). The 510-bit key is obsolete; however, we 
included it for efficiency comparison. With 5 PEs per multiplication core, we can fit two 
cores into the same FPGA, which takes full advantage of the parallelism in Algorithm 3.  
 
 The Number of PEs 
Bitlength-words 2 4 5 6 8 10 
4080 (240 words) 1.1058 1.0277 1.0147 1.0023 1.0000 1.0000 
2040 (120 words) 1.0891 1.0171 1.0078 1.0000 1.0089 1.0232 
1020 (60 words) 1.0526 1.0000 1.0035 1.0109 1.1068 1.3591 
510 (30 words) 1.0000 1.0111 1.1684 1.366 1.7875 2.1952 
Table 10. Time Area Products: The values are normalized to the smallest in the same 
row. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
* radix =217, s=120 (2040 bit) 
 PE=2 PE=4 PE=5 PE=6 PE=8 PE=10 Total 
Slices 679 1260 1553 1838 2435 3028 4656 
FF 809 1505 1854 2199 2901 3602 9312 
LUT 1180 2232 2760 3292 4353 5426 9312 
Block RAM 4 4 4 4 4 4 20 
Multiplier 4 8 10 12 16 20 20 
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 SPA protected* SPA+DPA Protected† 
Slices 3799 (81 %) 3899 (83 %) 
FF 4416 (47 %) 4493 (48 %) 
LUT 6750 (72 %)            6931 (74 %) 
Block Ram 14 (70 %) 16 (80 %) 
Multipliers 20 (100 %) 20 (100 %) 
Frequency 119 MHz 119 MHz 
Clock Cycles (max) 929 519 946 127 
Max Ex Time 7.81 ms 7.95 ms 
Table 11. Synthesis Results for 1020-bit exponentiation circuit (radix = 217 and s = 60)  
 
The exponentiation circuit (5 PE x 2) with and without DPA countermeasure are 
synthesized with speed optimization and the results are illustrated in Table 11. The area 
consumption stays approximately the same for larger bit-lengths and so does the 
frequency. Second circuit has a (1/s×100) percent cycle overhead due to DPA 
protection. 
 
3.5 Performance Analysis 
3.5.1 Clock Cycle Comparison 
 In this section, we provide a comparative analysis of the proposed design with 
respect to other designs synthesized for different FPGA technologies in literature. Table 
12 shows the number of clock cycles required for one 1024-bit modular multiplication 
via different Montgomery multipliers.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
* Montgomery Powering Ladder (Algorithm 3) is used as SPA protection. 
† Exponent blinding is used for DPA protection. 
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Design Implementation Time Complexity Clock Cycles 
[17] (R-2), pipelined* 2× (# multipliers+5) 134 (mult=62) 
[19] Radix-4 N/2+(N/32)x1.5 560 
Prop. R-217, pipelined max ((14+s), (12+9PE))×(s/PE) 907 (PE=5) 
[14] R-2, pipelined N 1024 
[10] Radix-2 N+1 1025 
[11] R-2, pipelined N+3 1027 
[7],[19] Radix-2 N+2+N/32 1058 
[8] R-2, pipelined (N/(w1 × PE)). max (PE , N/w2) 1062 
[6] R-4, pipelined 
 2 

  1  2 ,  

  2  
 2 2  1  

  1 ,  !"#$" 
~1104 
(w=64, NS=8) 
[9] R-2, pipelined 
2N +N/w-1 ,             if N/w+1 < 2.PE 
(N/PE)(N/w+1)+2(PE-1),     otherwise 
~2080 
(w=32, p = 16) 
 [15] R-2, pipelined 3×N 3072 
 
 
In [19], we have two circuits, one is based on conventional radix-2 
implementation which is designed to simulate [7] on the same FPGA device, the other 
circuit is based on radix-4. Both designs use distributed RAM as the main storage 
element and are non-pipelined. Although the design in [17] is the fastest in Table 12, it 
cannot fit in our target FPGA, Xilinx Spartan 3E-500, in that configuration due to its 
excessive use of multipliers. 
3.5.2 Execution Time Comparison 
Table 13 summarizes the resource usage and performance of various FPGA 
designs and the proposed one. Although the proposed design is not the fastest circuit, its 
execution speed outperforms many others; moreover, it performs the best in terms of 
time area product. 
 
                                                 
* For pipelined designs, we select optimum (both for area and speed) values for w and p. (w is bit length 
of a word and PE (or NS) is the number of processing elements or pipeline stages) 
Table 12. Time Complexities: N is the modulus bit-length and R stands for the radix. 
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Design Technology Freq (MHz) Area Ex. Time (µs) 
[17] Xilinx xc2v3000-6 90.11 N/A 1.49 
[19] radix-4 Xilinx xc2v6000 132.4 8328 slices 4.23 
Proposed 
(1020 bit) 
Xilinx xc3s500e-
4FG320C 
119 
1553 slices + 
10 multipliers 
7.62 
[14]* FPGA (?) 129.1 3611 slices 7.93 
[19] radix-2 Xilinx xc2v6000 137.2 6282 slices 8.21 
[10] Xilinx xc2v3000 75.23 11617 slices 13.45 
[11] Xilinx xcv1000 ~55 5058 slices 18.67 
[15] Xilinx V812E-BG-560 ~96 5706 slices 32.12 
Table 13.  Execution Times for 1024-bit modular multiplication 
 
We do not have entire performance and area details concerning the 
multiplication units in designs [3, 16, 17]; however, the exponentiation timings and 
areas are available. Our exponentiation engine has DPA and SPA protection, which the 
other designs lack and our execution time is fixed for a given bit-length. 
  
                                                 
* The authors in [14] use pre-computed values, but the pre-computation unit is not included in the 
multiplier (it is a part of the exponentiation circuitry) 
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Design Technology Frequency Area Ex. Time (ms) 
[3] Xilinx xc4vfx-10sf363 ~200/400* 
3937 slices + 
17 DSP48 
1.71 (max) 
[17] Xilinx xc2v3000-6 90.11 
14334 slices + 
62 multipliers 
2.33 (avg.) 
Proposed 
(1020 bit) Xilinx xc3s500e 119 
3899 slices +    
20 multipliers 
7.95 (max) 
[19] 
radix-4 
Xilinx xc2v6000 132.4 8328 slices 8.66 (max) 
[22] Xilinx xc3s4000 66 
18247 slices+ 
66 multipliers 
11.1 (?) 
[16] Xilinx xc40250xv 45.66 6633 slices 11.95 (max) 
[19] 
radix-2 
Xilinx xc2v6000 137.2 6282 slices 16.8 (max) 
Table 14. Execution Engine Performance: 1024-bit Exponentiation Results 
 
Our foremost design goal is not achieving the best timing but the best time-area 
product on an inexpensive FPGA. This gap in performances can be attributed to the 
following factors favoring the designs in [3] and [17]: 
( 1 ) More advanced (and expensive) FPGA,  
( 2 ) More resource usage,  
( 3 ) Higher clock frequency (favoring only [3]),  
( 4 ) Powerful DSP cells (favoring only [3]),  
( 5 ) Special acceleration techniques† used for exponentiation.  
 
Considering that the proposed circuit is intended for a low-end device, the 
achieved exponentiation speed, which is so far the record for a very low-price FPGA 
device to best of our knowledge, and is satisfactory for many applications. In Table 13 
and Table 14, the designs are mapped onto FPGA’s with different speed grades and 
features; e.g., the multiplier in [3] uses built-in DSP cells, which are available neither in 
our target device nor in many other FPGA devices. In this work, we try to use the 
maximum potential available on one of the smallest FPGAs; therefore, the time-area 
product is the vital criterion for us. 
                                                 
* The control unit is running at 200 MHz, while DSP48 cells (data path) are running at 400 MHz. 
† [3] uses sliding window mechanism.  
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We cannot directly use execution times for comparison purposes (because of the 
technological differences), instead we can use “total clock cycles required for one 
modular multiplication” as the performance indicator. Table 15 shows that the proposed 
design achieves the best {time×area} metric, which is an indication of good design and 
high utilization of the target device. 
Design Area (slices) Clock Cycles Time × Area 
[15] 5706 3072 12.607 
[10] 11617 1025 8.564 
[19] radix-2 6282 1058 4.780 
[11] 5058 1027 3.736 
[19] radix-4 8330 560 3.354 
[14] 3611 1024 2.659 
Proposed 1553*(3453) 907 1.000 (2.223) 
Table 15. Time-Area products normalized to proposed implementation†   
 
3.6 Compatibility Problems 
 
As we use 17 bit x 17 bit multipliers in the design to take the full advantage of 
given features of the FPGA chip, the implemented bit lengths are smaller than the 
widely employed ones that are the powers of 2 (e.g. 512-bit, 1024-bit, 2048-bit, etc). 
The security level provided by a 1020-bit implementation is approximately the same 
with 1024-bit implementation, however there can be compatibility problems between 
1024 and 1020 bit circuits in practical world (same case with 2048 bit and 2040-bit 
implementations). Therefore, we also include a table (Table 16) showing the required 
time for compatible versions of our implementations at the expense of some clock 
cycles. The number of words in each compatible version is one more than the 
previously mentioned designs; however, there will be no change in the frequency and 
the area at all. The average slowdown ratio is 3.6 %. 
 
 
                                                 
* The hardwired multipliers (we use 10 multipliers here [only one multiplication engine]) are not included 
in this area value. The value in parenthesis is the total area including the multipliers. 
† for ≈1024 bit multiplication 
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 The Number of PEs 
Bitlength -#words 2 4 5 6 8 10 
4097 (241 words) 30620 15440 12404 10380 7850 6332 
2057 (121 words) 8120 4130 3332 2800 2135 1736 
1037 (61 words) 2270 1175 956 810 648 644 
527 (31 words) 695 369 344 340 332 332 
Table 16. The Required Clock Cycles for Compatible Versions 
 
3.7 Conclusion and Future Work 
We designed a fast, efficient and parameterized multiplier and a secure 
exponentiation circuit for simple FPGA devices in the price range of $2-9 US*. This 
price range is at least one order of magnitude less than other devices used in previous 
works, where the primary purpose is to achieve the fastest time in modular 
exponentiation. It is true that time performance is always of an important concern; 
however, the price of the device used for realization is also an issue in many 
applications and there is not much work in this direction. We intended to fill this gap 
with our design, which achieves the best time-area product to the best of our knowledge 
in this category. 
Our target technology, Xilinx Spartan 3E-500, is a cost effective solution in 
many aspects, especially the use of the 90nm technology significantly reduces the die 
size, cost and the total power consumption, while increasing the frequency, and 
therefore it is one of the best choices for practical applications, where the manufacturing 
cost is the primary concern. 
The proposed multiplier is parametric, and therefore can be used for virtually 
any bit-length, where the upper limit on precision is dictated only by the capacity of 
Block-RAM available on the device†. However, since the most popular public key 
cryptosystem nowadays is RSA, we focused on the designs with precisions of 1020-bit 
and 2040-bit; the latter precision will be favored over the former in the near future due 
to increased security concerns. Our design completes one 1020-bit and 2040-bit 
                                                 
* The prices are from the year 2006  
http://www.xilinx.com/products/silicon_solutions/fpgas/spartan_series/spartan3e_fpgas/index.htm 
† The area and frequency of our circuit with longer operands stay approximately the same. 
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modular multiplications* in 7.62 µs and 27.0 µs, respectively with approximately the 
same device usage. The timing performance achieved for multiplication is either 
comparable or superior to most of the other designs in the literature despite the low 
resources available on the target device. In addition, our design has the lowest {time × 
area} product among the other multipliers. 
  We have also achieved to fit the exponentiation circuit (additional control unit) 
into the same device. Few designs in literature can outperform our design only by using 
more resources, better and expensive devices, and acceleration techniques for 
exponentiation. From practical point of view, our exponentiation circuit also resists 
against all known side-channel attacks  (namely SPA, DPA, fault attacks and (n-1) 
attacks) with minimal overhead. 
  As future work, we plan to design an improved exponentiation circuit that 
utilizes acceleration techniques such as the sliding window mechanism and bit encoding 
schemes to reduce the total execution time of modular exponentiation. Moreover, we 
will consider implementing our design to alternative FPGA’s such as Xilinx Spartan 3A 
and 3AN series that have DSP units.  
                                                 
* With a multiplication engine that utilizes half of the device (i.e. 5 PEs which use 10 multipliers) 
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4 Summary of Contributions 
 
In this thesis, we have presented two designs that have different goals. In the 
first design, we tried to maximize the speed of 2048-bit modular multiplication for 
hardware platforms. We adapted the well-known radix-2 Montgomery algorithm and 
obtained following results with the use of radix-4: 
 While the frequency of the circuit stayed approximately the same with respect to 
our reference radix-2 core, the execution time for 2048-bit modular 
multiplication improved significantly (82% reduction in FPGA implementation), 
because the cycle count is approximately halved with the use of radix-4 
datapath. Moreover, our circuit outperformed previous works significantly in 
terms of execution time. 
 A major improvement was also achieved in terms of time area product, which 
decreased by 37% and 41% for FPGA and ASIC designs respectively in 
comparison to the reference core.  
In the second design, we optimized our circuit according to the resources on our 
target FPGA, Xilinx Spartan 3E-500, which uses 90 nm technology. This technology is 
advantageous over previous generations; because faster clock speeds can be obtained 
while being cost effective. Our contribution in this design can be summarized as 
follows: 
 As the most popular PKC is RSA nowadays, we optimized our circuit for higher 
bit-lengths (for operands greater than 512 bits). Our implementation can be used 
in other PKC algorithms as is, except for ECC, (where a slight modification of 
the design is needed) because ECC utilizes much shorter key lengths. 
 We designed a high-speed multiplier and exponentiation circuit on an 
inexpensive FPGA by utilizing its hardwired multipliers, which are becoming 
more and more common in reconfigurable devices and we showed that 2040-bit 
exponentiation circuit can easily fit on such FPGAs. 
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 We provided an efficient modification of one of the best software algorithms for 
Montgomery multiplication to take advantage of simultaneously operating 
multipliers.  
 We showed that the {time × area} metric will shrink considerably by the use of 
the dedicated multipliers on FPGA. 
 We arranged the multipliers in a pipelined fashion to increase the device 
utilization and clock frequency. This arrangement also rendered a parametric 
design that can be used to perform multiplications and exponentiations up to 
virtually any bit-length as long as the memory resources sufficed.  
 We provided a parametric design for modular multiplier, which could be 
implemented on an FPGA that has as low as four block multipliers where the 
block size is also adjustable.    
 By the use of dual-port Block RAMs, we could overlap the phases of the 
algorithm and therefore the execution was accelerated considerably, while 
maintaining low area consumption. 
 We also implemented countermeasures to all known side-channel and fault-
induction attacks and demonstrated that they were affordable on a very modest 
FPGA device. 
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Appendix 
 
Figure 9. Waveform of One Stream 
 
 
 
 
 
• a = Start to start time (9 cycles) 
• a + b = Time required to finish one iteration of loop i in Algorithm 5. (s + 3 
cycle) 
• c = idle period of one multiplier 
  
        a             b                  c           One Stream 
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